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It is difficult to deny the importance of the Axiom of Choice in the development 
of mathematics in the twentieth century. The axiom preys on the minds even of 
those who indicate a bluff willingness to accept it. In their Algebras, Lattices, 
Varieties: Volume I, McKenzie, McNulty, and Taylor state the axiom of choice 
and remark, “We assume the validity of this axiom” [ 1987, 71. Despite their 
confidence, they observe about a subsequent result, “The theorem above, which 
is actually very straightforward, nevertheless invokes the Axiom of Choice” 
[ 1987,43 3. The attitude reminds one of the only weasel serving on the jury in Toad 
of Toad Hall; when the attorney for the defense pointed out that one of the rabbits 
on the jury was a weasel, the weasel was the only one to make an announcement 
that he was not. 
Before going too far into the subject, it would be useful to give a definition of the 
axiom. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the book by Herman and 
Jean Rubin entitled Equivalents of the Axiom of Choice has gone into a second 
volume and that different forms of the axiom have different equivalents [1963; 
19851. Here by the axiom of choice we refer to the form quoted by Moore from 
Zermelo: “Given any family T of non-empty sets, there is a function f which 
assigns to each member A of T an element f(A) of A” [Moore, 51. Much of the 
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discussion that Moore examines deals with how much the axiom can be weakened 
or altered and still preserve its mathematical usefulness. 
An illustration that Moore provides of the controversy over the axiom arises in 
the pages of van der Waerden’s Moderne Algebra. In the first edition [ 19301 van 
der Waerden felt comfortable in using the axiom, in the second [ 19371 he tried to 
do without it, even at the cost of sacrificing some of the consequences in algebra, 
while in the third edition [1950] he went back to accepting the axiom. It might be 
that the decision about the second edition coincided with the heyday of construc- 
tivist influence and the interplay of Dutch nationalism with intuitionism as sug- 
gested by Moore. In view of the wide influence of van der Waerden’s textbook, 
the debate over the axiom of choice was played out before a large mathematical 
audience. 
Perhaps a word about the title of Moore’s book is in order. The reader might be 
led to expect Zermelo to occupy the central role, and one of the author’s main 
claims involves Zermelo’s motivation for axiomatizing set theory, but the book is 
not a biography of Zermelo. In fact, the biographical treatment of many of the 
figures it discusses is sparse, even when it treats of mathematicians and philoso- 
phers hard to find out about elsewhere. Moore is doing intellectual history and 
pursues the characters of his story insofar as they contribute to the development 
of the axiom. If Thomas Jech had not published a volume with the title The Axiom 
of Choice in 1973, Moore might have been able to suppress Zermelo’s name in his 
own title. 
The wealth of material on the axiom of choice does not make the story easier to 
tell. In the anthology assembled by Jean van Heijenoort, From Frege to Giidel 
[1967], the entry in the index for the axiom of choice takes up nine lines, longer 
than any other except for that on the paradoxes. One of the historiographic issues 
that Moore examines in detail is the entanglement of the appearance of the para- 
doxes with the axiomatization of set theory. His careful separation of the strands 
of both stories will help the reader from jumping to hasty historical conclusions. 
Among the talents required of the historian of the axiom of choice linguistic 
competence is not the least. Moore cites material in English, French, German, 
Russian, Italian, Polish, and Rumanian (fortunately Brouwer’s relevant works in 
Dutch had been translated). Linguistic competence, however, applies to historical 
issues as well, as terminology has changed in the course of time. Lebesgue, for 
instance, refers to two groups as Idealists and Empiricists, which Moore clarifies 
by identifying them, respectively, with Realists and Idealists [Moore, 1001. Al- 
though the identification is not exact, it gives the reader unfamiliar with the 
historical setting something of a philosophical handle. 
Perhaps it goes without saying that the history of the axiom of choice requires 
mathematical sophistication and breadth of study. In the face of conflicting 
claims, Moore is able to make adjudications about what a demonstration succeeds 
in establishing and what assumptions were built into it. Especially in the earlier 
part of the book Moore provides proofs of his own (sometimes based on those of 
Jech, whose help he acknowledges) to give the flow of argument some mathemati- 
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cal substance. In addition, the discussions of the axiom of choice went on among 
set theorists, logicians, topologists, algebraists, and analysts. Moore moves 
smoothly from one field to another, providing an array of definitions for objects 
from the basis of a vector space to an ideal in a ring. In some cases, the definitions 
were useful even for a mathematically sophisticated reader, since different char- 
acterizations for the notions in question were emerging at the time. 
Telling the story of the axiom of choice requires an ability to point out that 
widespread myths are based on little more than reconstruction long after the 
event. Within two pages (pp. 12-13) Moore points out that the Soviet historian 
Medvedev misread the axiom of choice into the works of Gauss and that Bolzano 
did not use the method of interval subdivision in a particular paper, despite the 
claims of Boyer and Kline inter alias to the contrary. Claims about implicit use of 
techniques can be dangerous but Moore’s technical competence inclines the 
reader who has not seen the original source to put trust in his judgments. 
In fact, Moore’s primary thesis about Zermelo does fly in the face of a good deal 
of the secondary literature. A standard explanation for the axiomatization of set 
theory in the first decade of this century is the desire to protect set theory and the 
mathematics based on it from the consequences of the paradoxes. Moore dis- 
cusses the paradoxes of Cantor, Burali-Forti, Russell, and Richard, but also indi- 
cates the extent to which Zermelo was driven instead by the desire to provide a 
convincing base for his proof of the well-ordering theorem (that every set can be 
well-ordered). His reconstruction of the controversy surrounding the original ap- 
pearance of the well-ordering theorem is painstaking and sufficient to make his 
account of Zermelo’s behavior convincing. 
Even this does not pay full tribute to the detail of Moore’s historical analysis. It 
would be easy to suggest (as Michael Hallett did in his Cantorian set theory and 
limitation of size [19843) that Zermelo’s axiomatization consisted of exactly the 
axioms needed to formalize his proof of the well-ordering theorem. Hallett ob- 
serves in his introduction that Moore’s book appeared too late for him to use. The 
result (as Moore pointed out in a subsequent review of Hallett in The Journal of 
Symbolic Logic [19871) was neglect of Moore’s conclusion that the particular 
axioms chosen by Zermelo were the result of careful examination of the works of 
earlier writers on sets. The choice was not made in a conscious reaction to the 
controversy over the well-ordering theorem, but the decision to publish the axi- 
omatization which he had been considering for several years was taken in mathe- 
matical self-defense. 
Moore’s account of the evolution of the axiom of choice continues up to the 
time of publication, and much of the material he used for the more recent decades 
came out of conversations and contemporary articles. In particular, he treats both 
of Godel’s work with constructible sets to prove the consistency of the axiom and 
of Cohen’s introduction of forcing to prove the independence of the axiom. He 
brings the question of whether Godel had a proof of the latter to the reader’s 
attention without being able to settle the issue, and subsequent work has been no 
more successful. 
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It is safe to say that Moore’s book was greeted with enthusiasm and admiration 
by the historical and mathematical communities. Stan Wagon’s The Banach- 
Turski Paradox [1985] described Moore’s book as a “valuable historical account 
of many of the controversies concerning the axiom of choice” [ 1985, 2201. In 
Foundations of Constructive Mathematics, Michael J. Beeson remarks, “Moore 
has done an excellent job of documenting the story of Zermelo’s proof and its 
reception, so there is no need to discuss the matter further here” [1985, 4241. In 
her review of Moore’s book for The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Jean Rubin uses 
the terms “well-documented,” “coherent, ” “well-written,” and “readable,” and 
describes the book as an “excellent job of weaving many facts into a book that is 
pleasant to read” [ 1984, 659-6601. 
Nor was it only the English-speaking mathematical community that was im- 
pressed. Tony Levy in his Figures de Z’infini [1987] pays tribute to Moore’s book 
in his discussion of the axiom of choice [ 1987,229]. Levy also refers to a doctoral 
thesis from 1983 by Cassinet and Guillemot, L’Axiome du choix duns Zes math& 
matiques de Cauchy (1821) h GiideZ(I940), which has been less widely used than it 
might as a result of Moore’s publication. Garrett Birkhoff and William Aspray in a 
review in Isis attest to the “unusually complete bibliography” and to Moore’s 
“historical sensitivity and mastery of technical detail” [1984, 401-4021. No later 
work on that scale in the history of logic has been greeted with such enthusiasm. 
The book is remarkably well-produced and pays heed to diacritical marks in 
Polish as well as other European languages. The misspelling of Segre’s first name 
was the only consistent fault, and no reader should have any problems with the 
spelling of the algebraist McCoy’s first name (wrong on p. 230) or of Ryll-Nard- 
zewski (p. 231). John Dawson points out that the reference to the ‘Downward’ 
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem on page 258 should be to the ‘Upward’ version (in a 
1936 paper of Malcev). In a volume of such complexity of text the absence of more 
evident errors is a sign of the care taken. 
In a book of finite length some topics have to be slighted, and different readers 
will miss different subjects. One theme that Moore pursues only briefly is intui- 
tionist versions and interpretations of the axiom of choice. His discussion of the 
constructivist reservations in France about the axiom is quite detailed and sup- 
ported by translations of letters exchanged between Baire, Borel, Hadamard, and 
Lebesgue. Intuitionists subsequently accepted some versions of the axiom based 
on the intuitionist reinterpretation of the hypotheses. Some of the discussion still 
echoes the earlier debaters, as in A Course in Constructive Algebra, where Mines, 
Richman, and Ruitenburg observe “that arguments that depend essentially on this 
interpretation [assuming the existence of an algorithm] often have an unsatisfying 
feel to them which seems to be connected with the gratuitous ‘completion of an 
infinity’ that occurs when we subsume a potentially infinite number of items of 
information into a single algorithm” [1988, 341. 
Another area that Moore omits from his discussion of more recent develop- 
ments is topos theory. The development of category theory as a whole is not close 
to the core of Moore’s story, but since one of his themes is the influence of 
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mathematical practice on the approach to foundations, the casting of the axiom of 
choice in category-theoretic terms, as in Goldblatt’s Topoi [1984, 2901, would 
continue the story. It might also help to provide relief from the dose of set theory 
that accompanies the later stages of developments. 
A broader field left untouched on the whole is the influence of external factors 
on the work of those contributing to the axiomatization of set theory. Every now 
and then Moore will toss in a tantalizing reference, such as, “Then, since posi- 
tions in mathematics were rare in Poland, Mostowski went to Zurich in order to 
become an actuary” (p. 276). After mentioning Edward Szpilrajn, Moore ob- 
serves, “After the Second World War he changed his family name to Marc- 
zewski” (p. 222). In examining the response to Zermelo’s original proof, Moore 
breaks the discussion down by country, but he does not look in general for 
extramathematical sources for national reaction. There was more that he could 
have said, but perhaps he was reluctant to muddy the flow of ideas. It would have 
been possible to shape the flow by means of background without impeding it. 
As has been indicated throughout this review, Moore is sensitive to the point 
(which he makes) that historical interrelationships can differ from logical ones. 
Nevertheless, he still falls victim at times in the course of historical exposition to 
the temptation of mathematical language based on a logical sequence of develop- 
ment. The use of terms like “necessarily” makes the historian uneasy, although 
they fit perfectly into a formal system (p. 57). There is a delicate distinction 
between giving a mathematical analysis of an argument advanced a century ago 
and looking at it sub specie aeternitatis, as Moore notes in his review of Hallett 
[1987, 5691. 
Indeed, the fact that with all his caution Moore can sometimes succumb to the 
temptation to let the logic tell the story indicates the extent to which this is the 
professional hazard par excellence of historians of mathematics. The texts being 
studied are not disjointed collections of sentences, but the expressions of se- 
quences of arguments. On the other hand, there is a limit to what can be assumed 
as the glue that held the argument together in the mind of its original expositor. 
The mathematician will hasten to fill in gaps in an argument, while the historian 
has to display almost unnatural restraint. The historian will gain little credit from 
the mathematical community for displaying that restraint, while the argument in 
question will often not be accessible to more general historians able to appreciate 
the value of restraint. 
The philosophical element in Moore’s treatment comes out primarily in his 
description of mathematical practice. As he observes in his conclusion, “one of 
the most regrettable aspects of the controversy was that, after the initial debate, 
mathematicians did not significantly deepen their philosophies of mathematics. 
The immense body of mathematical results concerning the Axiom’s deductive 
strength . . . did not lead to philosophical insights” (p. 309). His observations 
about proofs as social affairs follow on a quotation by C.J. Keyser which raises 
the issue. Moore quickly turns the discussion to a historical point (p. 137). 
Since the accomplishment of the magnum opus on the axiom of choice, Moore 
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has pursued some of the themes that it raised. In particular, his subsequent article 
on “The Emergence of First-Order Logic” looks at the idea of logic underlying 
attitudes toward set theory and axiomatization [Moore 19881. His shorter pieces 
display the virtues of his longer work on the appropriate scale. 
Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice is a landmark in the history of logic, especially in 
English. The review of Birkhoff and Aspray mentioned above put the book in the 
tradition of van Heijenoort’s anthology and Joseph Dauben’s Georg Cantor 
[1979]. Moore’s book combines the mathematical depth of the former with the 
historical sensitivity of the latter. As a historian of logic, Moore has been an 
influence on younger scholars. His volume on Zermelo exemplifies just how valu- 
able that influence will be. 
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